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Several recent tax changes have increased the incentive for companies to 
pay  dividends  compared  to  retaining  earnings.  These  are  the 
introduction of  the Capital Gains Tax (CGT), dividend imputation and 
the taxation of  the earnings of  superannuation funds.  In this paper we 
examine the determinants of  a company's dividend policy and within 
this framework look at how these tax changes have influenced dividend 
payments. 
We present some empirical results that suggest that both cash flow and 
tax considerations are significant determinants of  dividend behaviour. 
Real  dividends per  share increased  by  about 38 per  cent between 
1985/86 and 1990/91.  We estimate that the tax changes account for a 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
From  a  macroeconomic  perspective,  dividend policy  is important 
because of  its effects on the financing behaviour of  firms and because of 
its implications for  corporate  saving.  The former is of  particular 
significance to monetary authorities if a distinct change in the dividend 
policy of  firms induces a shift in the financing preferences of  firms. This 
has implications for the behaviour of  credit and the transmission of 
monetary policy. 
Recent changes to the tax system are likely to influence companies' 
dividend policies.  These changes are the introduction of  the capital 
gains tax in September 1985, the introduction of  dividend imputation in 
July 1987 and the introduction of  a 15 per cent tax on the earnings of 
superannuation  funds in  July 1988.  Several recent  papers  have 
examined the impact that these changes have had on the dividend 
payout ratio (e.g., Nicol (1991)). In  this paper we expand on this work 
by examining the payout behaviour over a longer time horizon and by 
estimating the impact of  these tax changes on dividends. 
We examine the behaviour of  the dividend payout ratio over the period 
1959/60 to 1990/91.  We use three sources of  data:  aggregate data for 
private corporate trading enterprises, a sample of  companies quoted on 
the Australian Stock Exchange, and earnings and dividend yield data 
from the Stock Exchange.  To  anticipate  the results, we find  that 
dividend  payments  are  dependent  on  both  cash  flow  and  tax 
considerations.  We  estimate that the tax changes account for a rise in 
real dividends per share of  about 20  per  cent between  1985/86 and 
1990/91. 
The plan of  the rest of  the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses 
the theoretical determinants of  dividend policy.  Section 3 looks at some 
recent influences on the payout ratio in Australia.  Section 4 examines the trends in the payout ratio.  We present some empirical results on the 
determinants of  dividend policy in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
2.  THE DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND POLICY 
One of  the most influential works on dividend policy is by Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) who argued that, given a firm's investment decision, 
its dividend policy is irrelevant to its market valuation. The value of  the 
firm is solely determined by the stream of  future earnings.  The division 
of  earnings between dividends and retained earnings will not affect this 
value as long as the firm's investment policy is unaltered.  There is no 
unique optimum dividend payout ratio.  In  the Modigliani/Miller 
environment dividends should not be paid out at all in a tax regime that 
discriminates against  dividend income and all earnings should be 
retained when capital gains are taxed favourably. Of  course, in practice, 
this is rarely the case.  Other reasons have to be sought to explain the 
payment of  dividends: 
(i)  Signalling 
Signalling  theory  argues  that  managers  (insiders)  have  better 
information about the firm's prospects than shareholders (outsiders), but 
the latter have an interest in receiving as much information as possible 
on the firm in order to determine their portfolio allocation.1 Dividends 
convey a signal about a firmsf present and future cash flows from 
investments. 
(ii) Uncertainty 
Gordon (1962) argues that dividends expected in the near future are less 
risky  than  those  expected  over  a  longer  horizon.  Risk  averse 
shareholders will discount expected future dividends at a higher rate to 
compensate  for  the  higher  risk.  Therefore  investors  will  not be 
indifferent between the payment of  current dividends and the retention 
1  See Poterba and Summers (1984), Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), 
Ofer and Thakor (1987) and John and Williams (1985). of  earnings.  Crockett  (1988) makes a similar point: if  stockholders 
perceive the stream of  cash flows generated by an investment as more 
uncertain than current dividend payments, they will discount it at a 
higher rate. 
(iii)  Agency costs 
In  agency cost models (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) the payment of 
dividends restricts the actions of  management and so reduces costs from 
possible control problems caused by  the separation of  ownership and 
management. 
(iv) Issue and Transaction costs 
Modigliani  and Miller  argue that if  a firm wishes to  pay a higher 
dividend without changing its investment and borrowing plans, it may 
finance the dividend payment by issuing equity.  In practice, this will 
require the company to meet the issue costs.  Similarly, shareholders 
who require current income will be required to sell a portion of  their 
share portfolio and will also be subject to transaction costs. 
(v) Taxation 
The dividend irrelevance theorem  holds in a world  without  taxes. 
Differential taxes on dividends and capital gains alter the preference of 
individual investors for receiving income in one form or the other. This 
market imperfection is the main focus of  this paper.  Section 3 examines 
the effects of  tax changes on individuals' preferences in the context of 
the switch in Australia  from a classic double taxation  system to  a 
dividend imputation system. 
Although the ideas presented  above provide some rationale for the 
observed widespread payment of  dividends, there is still considerable 
debate as to the appropriate framework for thinking about dividend 
policy.  Without a strong theoretical foundation underlying dividend 
policy,  it  is not  surprising then,  that  the  literature provides little 
guidance  as to  the  specific factors  that  managers  consider  when 
establishing a dividend policy. There is some agreement that firms have target payout  ratios,  but  are reluctant  to  change  dividends when 
earnings change, believing that shareholders prefer a steady stream of 
dividends.  However there is little agreement as to the factors that 
determine target payout ratios.  In this paper we focus on two factors 
that appear to be  important in Australia: cash flows and tax policy. 
Cash flow determines the long-run capacity of  firms to pay dividends 
and the tax regime influences the preferences of  shareholders as to the 
form of  their returns.  Other factors that may also be important are a 
firm's liquidity, funds requirements, access to capital markets, costs of 
securing external finance, income and capital gearing, and industry 
norms.  Section 5 examines the significance of  taxation, cashflow and 
other possible determinants of  dividend payments. 
3.  INFLUENCES ON THE PAYOUT RATIO IN THE AUSTRALIAN 
CONTEXT 
This section looks at factors influencing the dividend payout ratio in 
Australia. It focuses, in particular, on the tax treatment of  dividends. 
3.1 Taxes 
Several major changes to the Australian tax system have been made 
since 1985.  These have been aimed at reducing the distortions affecting 
company financing decisions and the allocation of  investors' savings 
that were previously present in the tax system.  Each of  these changes 
has implications for dividend policy. 
The capital gain on an asset acquired after September 1985 is subject to 
Capital Gains Tax (CGT).  If  the asset is held for more than one year, 
only the real gain is taxable.  The capital gains tax was introduced to 
redress the bias in the tax system towards income received in the form 
of  capital gains, and to reduce the distortion towards investment in 
those more 'speculative' assets yielding income in the form of  capital 
gains. 
In July 1987 a full imputation system was introduced which eliminated 
the double taxation of  company income.  Prior to this, company income distributed as dividends was taxed twice, thus making returns in the 
form of  dividends less attractive than other returns.  This may have 
distorted investors' portfolio allocations away from equity. 
The effect of  dividend imputation was magnified in July 1988  when a 
tax of  15 per cent was imposed on the earnings of  superannuation funds. 
Previously, superannuation funds were exempt from tax and therefore 
the introduction of  imputation did not affect their returns.  When the 
tax was introduced on their earnings, they were able to make use of  the 
imputation credit.  This increased the attractiveness of  equity relative to 
alternative assets compared with the situation when funds paid no tax. 
In the next section we explain how imputation operates and in the 
second section we examine the effects of  the various tax changes on 
dividend policy. 
3.1 (a) Dividend imputation - how it works 
Corporate  tax  law is  complex  and a  full discussion  of  dividend 
imputation is beyond the scope of  this paper.  In this section we present 
a simplified review of  the main aspects of  dividend imputation as it 
applies to several main classes of  investors. 
Prior to the introduction of  dividend imputation, company tax was 
levied on profits earned and after-tax profits distributed as dividends 
were taxed again in the hands of  shareholders.  Dividend imputation 
ensures that company profits paid out as dividends are taxed only once. 
Companies credit their "franking accounts" with the amount of  income 
that can be distributed as franked dividends. Credits arise mainly from 
tax payments made or from receiving franked dividends from the 
company's shareholdings. Debits arise from paying franked dividends. 
Table 1 provides estimates of  the degree of  franking for a sample of 
industrial and resource  companies listed  on  the  Australian  Stock 
Exchange over the period 1987 to 1991.2 
2  The sample is comprised of  126 leading industrials and 14  major  resource 
companies. Table 1:  Franking Behaviour 
(percent of dividends) 
Half  Year Ended  Industrials  Resources 
December 1987  76.8  66.9 
June 1988  84.9  52.1 
December 1988  86.1  81.3 
June 1989  89.0  70.1 
December 1989  90.2  92.0 
June 1990  82.8  88.6 
December 1990  81.7  90.2 
June 1991  82.5  95.5 
December 1991  78.8  79.1 
Source: J.B. Were & Son, Profit Monitor, May 1992 
Shareholders receive franking credits to the extent that company tax has 
already been paid on dividends received.  They are then able to offset 
these credits against taxable income that is derived from any source, not 
just dividends.  Any excess credits cannot be refunded to a shareholder, 
offset  against a shareholder's Medicare  Levy,  or carried  forward. 
Therefore, if  a shareholder has insufficient tax liabilities against which to 
offset the imputation credits, the credits will be lost. 
Table 2 shows the effects of  dividend imputation for four different 
groups of  shareholders subject to different marginal tax rates, namely; 
individuals, companies, superannuation funds, and non-residents. We 
assume the following: a fully franked dividend of  61 cents per share is 
paid and each shareholder holds 100 shares. Table 2:  Impact of Dividend Imputation on Shareholders 
Individual  Super fund  Companv  Non-residen  ts 
Marginal Tax Rate  47%  15%  39% 
Franked dividend  61  61  6  1 
Imputation credit  39  39  0 
$61*(~/1-T) 
Assessable Income  -  100  -  100  -  61 
Tax payable  47  15  24 
-tax credit  -  39  -  39  -  24 
Tax payable  -  8  -  -24  -  0  -  0 
After tax return  53  85  6  1  6  1 
Before-tax yield  6.1  %  6.190  6.1%  6.1% 
After-tax yield  5.3%  8.5%  6.1  %  6.1  % 
When paying tax on dividends received, shareholders are required to 
gross up the dividend by the amount of  tax that has been paid by the 
company on the profit associated with the dividend. Given a 39 per cent 
company tax rate, T,  the tax paid is equal to 
Dividend * ~/(l-z) 
= $61*(0.39/0.61) = $39 
Thus for a 39 per cent company tax rate, the $61 dividend received must 
be grossed up by $39 and the grossed-up value of  $100 must be included 
in their assessable income. Shareholders are then taxed at their margnal 
rate on the grossed up  amount, but receive tax credits for the tax already 
paid by the company.  For  the individual shareholder on the top 
marginal rate of  47 per cent, the tax Liability on the $100 is $47, but this is 
reduced by the tax credit of  $39. The shareholder has to pay tax of  $8 on 
the dividends received.  Table 2 shows the different effects for the four 
groups of  investors.  Note that non-residents do not participate in the 
dividend imputation system but are exempt from dividend withholding 
tax if dividends received are franked. The table shows the before and after tax yields of  dividends for the 
different shareholders. Superannuation funds receive the highest after- 
tax return on dividends while individual shareholders paying tax at the 
top marginal rate receive the lowest.  The latter group are nevertheless 
better off  than in the previous regime where dividends would have been 
taxed  twice, reducing the after-tax yield  to  3.2 per  cent (assuming 
unad.justed equity prices). 
3.1 (b) The effect of  tax changes on shareholders' preferences for 
retentions and dividends 
In this section, we identify the effect of  the changes in tax arrangements 
for dividends, capital gains and superannuation funds on the four 
different classes of  shareholders previously identified:  individuals, 
companies (other than superannuation funds), superannuation funds 
and overseas residents. Table 3 outlines the timetable of  tax changes as 
they affect these groups of  investors and shows the current tax position 
of  each. 
The above-mentioned tax changes should have had an influence on the 
desired dividend payout ratio of  companies by  altering the relative 
value of  retained earnings vis-a-vis dividends.  Poterba and Summers 
(1985) define a tax discrimination variable, 8, as the opportunity cost of 
retained earnings in terms of  dividends foregone, both measured after 
personal tax.  If  there is no discrimination, the value of  8 is one.  If  8 is 
less than one, capital gains are favoured by the tax system, if 8 is greater 
than one, dividends are favoured. 8 is defined as, 
where o is the effective marginal personal tax rate on dividends and c is 
the effective marginal personal tax rate on capital gains.  Below we 
consider 8 for each of  the four groups of  investors we have identified 
and then construct an aggregate measure of  8. Table 3:  Taxation 
For individuals, there are a wide range of  tax bands.  Here, we consider 
two:  the first for someone on average income, the second for someone 
paying  the  highest  marginal personal income  tax  rate.  The  only 
difference this distinction makes is in the size of  the tax bias. There is 
never a case where one of  the groups of  personal investors considered 
prefers  dividends and the other prefers capital gains.  There was a 
significant bias in favour of  capital gains before the introduction of  the 
capital gains tax.  Between the introduction of  the CGT and imputation, 
there was a slight bias in favour of  capital gains. Since imputation, there 
has been a bias in favour of  receiving dvidends. Some individuals who 
are low marginal rate taxpayers and who have insufficient other income 
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to residents) company tax rate.  However, this is not likely to be  very important 
because these people are unlikely to be major investors in equity. 
Superannuation funds were  indifferent  between  capital gains and 
receiving dividends prior to the introduction of  the 15 per cent tax on 
their earnings in September 1988. However, the introduction of  the tax, 
at a lower rate than the company tax rate, generated a strong bias 
towards receiving dividends for this group of  shareholders.  This is 
because superannuation funds can offset the extra tax credits against 
other taxable income. 
For overseas investors, the withholding tax is not imposed on fully- 
franked dividends. This extends the benefits of  imputation to overseas 
investors.  However, because the amount of  the withholding tax on a 
dividend will be less than the value of  the imputation credit, overseas 
investors do not receive the full benefits received by domestic investors. 
Although  foreign investors are disadvantaged  relative  to domestic 
investors insofar as they are unable to utilise fully tax credits derived 
from franked dividends, the combination of  the introduction of  CGT 
and the abolition of  the dividend withholding tax for fully-franked 
dividends have contributed towards 8 being greater than one.  This, 
however, is only half  the story, since we have not included the taxes 
imposed on non-residents in their home country. 
To derive an aggregate measure of  8, the 8's  for each group of  investors 
need to be given appropriate weights.  No data are available on equity 
holdings by sector. Therefore, the weights for each group are calculated 
from ABS data on dividends received.3 Data are available from 1969/70. 
The calculated weights are plotted in Graph 1.  These figures indicate 
that individuals' direct holdings of  equity have fallen sigruficantly over 
the period, from over 60 per cent in the late 1960s to 14 per cent in 
1990/91.  Holdings by superannuation funds and life offices rose to 
--- -  - 
3  The ABS provide data on dividends received by life offices and super funds and 
are unable to split the data any further. This complicates the analysis of tax changes 
since life offices are taxed at the company tax rate, while super funds are taxed at 
15 per cent. However, as at September 1991 life offices held $61.8 billion of  assets in 
super products, over 70 per cent of  total assets, and these assets are taxed at the 
concessional rate of  15 per cent.  Thus, not much is lost by making the simplifying 
assumption that all  dividends are received by super funds. 30 per cent in 1990/91 compared with about 7 per cent in the late 1960s. 
However, this rise has not matched the decline in individuals' holdings 
over the period. Holdings by overseas investors have also risen over the 
period. 
Graph 1: Dividends Received by Sector 
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Graph 2 plots the aggregate measure of  0 on the basis of  both the 
average and top rate personal tax rates.  Clearly, the net result of  the 
changes in taxes since 1985/86 has been to encourage the payment of 
dividends by firms. 
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111111111111111111~1I 3.2 Dividend Reinvestment Schemes 
A related factor that has influenced the dividend payout ratio in recent 
years is the increase in dividend reinvestment schemes.  These schemes 
allow shareholders to reinvest their dividend receipts in shares in the 
company.  They resolve the conflict between a company's desire to 
retain profits and the shareholders' desire for a higher dividend payout 
by  enabling  the  firm  to  recapture  the  dividends  it  pays  out. 
Shareholders prefer to receive imputation credits sooner rather than 
later as the value of  these credits declines in real value over time.4 
Dividend reinvestment schemes became an important source of  equity 
finance in the late 1980s, rising from 4 per cent of  total equity raised in 
1987/88 to 33 per cent in 1990/91 (see Table 4).  Approximately one 
third of  dividends were reinvested in 1990/91.  Under the schemes, 
shares are normally priced at a discount to the market price and are 
attractive to small investors because of  the lack of  transaction costs. For 
companies where capital issue costs are high, dividend reinvestment 
plans are also a favourable option.  The success of  these reinvestment 
schemes has encouraged companies to pay a higher level of  dividends in 
the knowledge that they will retain the funds. 
Table 4: Dividend Reinvestment Schemes 
(percentage of  total equity raisings) 
4  Also popular  following the  introduction of  dividend  imputation was  the 
sbeaming of  dividends so that franking credits were directed to those shareholders 
who could use them.  For instance, investors could elect to receive a fully-franked 
cash dividend or either a bonus-in-lieu of  dividends or an unfranked dividend.  If 
the bonus shares were issued out of  the share premium reserve they were not 
deemed as dividends. The main benefit from the latter accrued to shareholders who 
had pre-September 1985 shareholdings since the bonus shares issued were exempt 
from capital gains tax.  However, from I July 1990 dividend streaming was brought 
to an end when bonus shares issued out of  share premium reserves under streaming 
arrangments, resulted in a debit to the company's franking account. 









32.7 4. TRENDS IN THE DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO 
In this section we present three different sources of  information on the 
dividend-payout ratio.  These are from the annual national accounts, 
from a sample of  companies quoted on the Australian Stock Exchange, 
and from earnings and dividend yield data from the Stock Exchange. 
The  payout  ratios  from  the  two sets of  stock  exchange data  are 
sigruhcantly higher than that calculated from the national accounts data. 
This is partly due to the different denominators used to calculate the 
ratio; gross cash flow is used for the national accounts measure while 
net profit after tax is used for the stock exchange measures.  A further 
reason is that the national accounts measure includes smaller companies 
that are more likely to have a lower payout ratio.  For  small firms 
internal funding may be much cheaper than other forms of  finance as 
these firms are likely to face higher costs of  raising debt and equity in 
the market. 
Long-run data are available from the National Accounts.  Graph 3 plots 
the dividend payout ratio from 1960/61.  It suggests that the data can be 
split into four periods: 
the 1960s where the payout ratio followed a gentle downward trend. 
the mid 1970s when the payout ratio rose quite sharply. 
the  mid-1970s  to  1986  when  the  payout  ratio declined sharply 
reacht~g  a trough of  18 per cent in 1985/86. 
1986/87 to the present when the payout ratio rose quite sharply. 
Graph 3: Dividend  Payout Ratio 
% Graph 4 shows the components of  the payout ratio separately.  Cash 
flow is used to approximate the amount of  funds that a company has 
available either to distribute to shareholders in the form of  dividends, or 
to retain to invest in the company.  Dividends exhibited only slow 
growth until  1987.  Indeed,  in real terms they remained  virtually 
unchanged.  Changes in the payout  ratio over this period  simply 
reflected movements in cash flow which grew strongly between 1974 
and 1980 and then again between 1983 and 1989. Since 1987, dividends 
(in real  and nominal terms) have  risen,  driving  the payout  ratio 
upwards, although the fall in cash flow has also contributed to the rise 
in the ratio. 
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A likely explanation of  the change in dividend behaviour is that prior to 
the tax changes outlined earlier,  companies retained at least part of  any 
rise in cash flow because  there was a significant bias in favour of 
retentions.  More recently, changes in cash flow have been more fully 
reflected in changes in dividends because of  the tax advantages to 
shareholders of  receiving  dividends over  capital  gains.  Another 
explanation is that companies found it hard to obtain external financing 
during the 1970s because of  credit controls and periodic weaknesses in 
the equity market and so chose to retain a large proportion of  their 
earnings. The dividend payout ratio calculated from the earnings and dividend 
yield data is shown in Graph 5 for companies in the industrials and 
resources indices. The industrial companiesf payout ratio jumps sharply 
in 1988/89.  The behaviour of  the resource companies is somewhat 
different.  The introduction  of  imputation appears to have had no 
impact on these companies and the payout ratio has remained around 
the 50 per cent level for much of  the 1980s.  Nicol (1991) suggests that 
mining companies pay less income tax relative to income earned than 
their industrial counterparts, and are less likely to be able to fully frank 
their  dividends.  Thus tax  changes have a limited impact on these 
companies. 
Graph 5: Stock Exchange Dividend Payout Ratios 
% 
Graph 6 plots two dividend payout measures  for a sample of  55 non- 
financial companies quoted on the Australian Stock Exchange. The first 
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of  average real dividends per share.  Both measures show a flat profile 
until 1987/88,  a sharp rise and then a fall reflecting the depressed 
economic conditions in the early 1990s. The latter measure is used in the 
empirical work reported below. 
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Resources Graph 6: Dividend Payout Ratios 
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The above discussion shows that tax changes have occurred which, in 
theory, should have led to  an increase in the proportion of  firms' 
earnings paid out as dividends. At the same time there has been an 
increase in the various dividend payout ratio measures. However, other 
factors also affect dividend payout ratios. In the final section we use an 
econometric model to apportion the changes in dividends to the various 
effects. We use a sample of  55 non-financial companies quoted on the 
Australian Stock Exchange. Data are available from 1980/81 to 1990/91. 
5.  THE DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDEND POLICY 
5.1 The Model 
The simple model of  dividend behaviour presented below is based on 
the assumption that companies partially adjust dividends each period 
towards their target level.  This partial adjustment behaviour  is a 
common  assumption  in  dividend  models  and  may  reflect  both 
signalling behaviour and constraints that some companies face in capital 
markets. This target level of  real dividends per share is given by, where D'ift is the target real dividend level per share, Xi,t represents the 
set of  explanatory variables that affect the target level of  real dividends 
per share, Zii  is a firm specific effect that captures the possibility that 
some firms may systematically wish to pay higher dividends, i=l, ...., 55 
is the company index and t=l, ...., 11 is the time index. The adjustment of 
actual dividends to their target level is assumed to be determined by, 
where [  is the ad.justment parameter.  Substituting (1) into (2) and 
rearranging, 
where pl = (1 - [),  cq = 6i[ and P2  = [$ . 
Note that the intercept term varies across firms but the other parameters 
are constant across firms. The set of  explanatory variables Xift includes 
the tax variable  8+,  calculated earlier, and a cashflow measure to capture 
the capacity of  companies to distribute  funds  to shareholders.  The 
cashflow measure, Gilt, is real cashflow per share after adjustment of 
revenue and cost items associated with options, partly paid shares and 
convertible securities and after adjustment  for intervening pro-rata 
issues to existing shareholders.5 The dividend measure is real dividends 
per share adjusted for bonus and rights issues.  All variables, with the 
exception of  the tax discrimination variable, are in logarithms. 
Other potential determinants of  dividend policy were also investigated. 
These included capital gearing variables;  the cost of  debt and cost of 
equity;  industry dummies to capture the effects of  possible common 
features within industry groupings such as capital structure, asset 
profile, operating cashflow requirements, size and profitability; a size 
variable to proxy firms access to capital markets; and a depreciation 
variable.  There was no evidence that these factors had a significant 
5  For a discussion of  the construction of  these ratios see 'The STATEX Guide to 
Ratios", Australian Stock Exchange. influence on dividend  policy  and they were  not  included  in  the 
estimating equation reported below. 
5.2 Estimation 
Typically, panel data models are estimated using either fixed or random 
effects techniques.  The fixed effect technique is predicated on the 
assumption that the effects which are specific to each firm are correlated 
with the other explanatory variables.  As a result the individual effects 
are captured  by the inclusion of  a firm-specific dummy variable in each 
equation.  The random effects estimator is based on the assumption that 
the individual effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. 
As a result they are included in the error term and Generalised Least 
Squares is used. 
In this case, neither technique is appropriate as (3) includes a lagged 
dependent variable  (see Hsiao  (1986)).  Consistent  estimates  can, 
however,  be  obtained  by  first  differencing  (3)  and  then  using 
instrumental variables, 
The instruments used are the logarithm of  the level of  real dividends per 
share in period t-2, the contemporaneous change in the logarithm of  real 
cash  flow  per  share and the contemporaneous change in the tax 
discrimination variable.  In the estimation, corrections were also made to 
the covariance matrix to allow for conditional heteroskedasticity.  We 
also perform a test  for parameter stability.  To do this we split the 
sample into two subperiods 1980/81 to 1984/85 and 1985/86 to 1990/91 
and perform a Wald test of  the null hypothesis that the parameters are 
constant across periods.  This procedure is used because we use an 
instrumental variables estimation technique and because we apply a 
heteroskedasticity correction.  A review of  estimation of  panel-data 
models is provided in Appendix 1. 
5.3 Results 
The results of  estimating equation (3') are reported in Table 5.  The tax 
discrimination variable and the cashflow variable are correctly signed and significant.  A one per cent rise in real cashflow per share causes a 
0.39 per cent rise in real dividends per share in the short run and a 0.58 
per cent rise over the long run.  This is consistent with the payout ratios 
described in Section 4 and suggests that the capacity to pay dividends is 
an important determinant of  dividend payout behaviour. 
In addition, the results support the idea that the tax system provides an 
incentive structure that influences whether dividends or capital gains 
are the preferred form of  returns for investors.  A 0.1 unit rise in the tax 
discrimination variable causes a 3.4 per cent rise in real dividends per 
share in the short run and a 5.0 per cent rise over the long run.  A 0.1 
unit rise in the tax discrimination variable is interpreted as an additional 
10 per cent of a unit of  after-tax dividends foregone for any given level 
of  after-tax retained earnings.6 
The point estimate of  the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
suggests that dividends adjust fairly quickly to the desired level, with 
about two thirds of  the adjustment occurring in the first year.  The 
explanatory power of  the model was poor.  Although other factors, such 
as those mentioned above, may also influence dividend decisions, the 
influence of  these factors cannot be identified in our sample.  The null 
hypothesis of  structural stability between the first and second half of  the 
sample period could not be rejected. 
The results of  these regressions allow an estimate of  the increase in 
dividend payments that resulted from the tax changes implemented 
since 1985 to be made?  Real dividends per share increased by about 38 
per  cent between  1985/86  and 1990/91.  We  estimate that the tax 
changes accounted for about a 20  per cent rise in real dividends per 
share over this period. 
6  The effective marginal tax rates are bounded by 0 and I and these results apply to 
values within the normal ranges of  these variables. 
7  The full effect on real dividends per share over the five-year period is calculated 
using an expanded version of  equation (3')  in which the lagged dependent variable 
is replaced using backwards substitution.  The changes in the tax discrimination 
variable in each year are calculated and the estimated coefficients are used  to 
calculate the current and lagged effects. Table 5:  Estimation Results 
Estimated Equation: 
Di,t - Di,t-1 = Pl(Di,t-1 - Di,t-2) + b(et  - et-1) + P3(Ci,t - Ci,t-1) + ki,t - €i,t-1) 
Estimation Period: 1981-1991; 55 Non-Financial Companies. 
Tax Variable  0.34 
(3.91) 
Real CasMow/Share  0.39 
(5.22) 
Real Dividends/Share  lagged  0.32 
(1.41) 
(t-statistics in brackets) 
- 
R2  = 0.08 
Structual Stability Test: 
x2(3) = 0.065 (p = 0.99) 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Recent changes to  the tax system have altered the incentive to pay 
dividends relative to retaining earnings.  In this paper we highlighted 
the tax changes as they have affected different groups of  investors and 
looked at other influences  on dividend policy.  Tax  changes and 
cashflow are identified  as two determinants of  dividend policy  in 
Australia. The estimates made in the paper suggest that the tax changes 
accounted  for about a 20  per cent rise in real dividends per share 
between 1985  /86 and 1990  /91.  Our preliminary investigations did not 
reveal any evidence that other factors, such as capital gearing, the cost of 
debt and cost of  equity, industry grouping or size had a significant 
influence on dividend policy in Australia over the sample period. APPENDIX 1: ESTIMATION WITH PANEL-DATA MODELS 
Here we review the estimation of  panel-data models.  In particular we 
examine problems of  estimation of  panel-data  models that contain 
lagged dependent variables.8 
Consider the linear model 
where ai  is an individual specific component and Ei,t  is a mean-zero 
time-varying error. OLS will yieldconsistent coefficient estimates only 
if Xi,t is uncorrelated with the error term (where the error term ui,t = a 
+ Ei,t  ).  Two estimators have been developed to handle the systematic 
tendency of  ai  to be higher for some units than for others: the random 
effects estimator and the fixed effects estimator.9 
If  the individual specific component is assumed to be random with 
respect to the explanatory variables, the GLS (random effects) estimator 
provides efficient and consistent estimates.  The GLS estimates can be 
obtained by OLS using the following transformation of  equation (1) 
where variables without the time subscripts are the individual means, yl 
= 1- oe /d(&  + T&,)  and where 02,  is the variance of  the time-varying 
error and  is the variance of  the individual specific error. 
If  however, ai  is not independent of  X the random effects estimator will 
not give consistent estimates.  In this case  the individual effects are 
represented by  a dummy variable for each individual (fixed effects 
estimator). Rather than include a dummy variable for each individual 
however, it is computationally easier to estimate the following model 
8 This review draws heavily on the recent paper by Keane and Runkle (1992). 
9  See Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt (1989). The effect of  subtracting individual means is to eliminate the fixed effect. 
The same result would be obtained if separate intercepts were estimated 
for each individual. 
For consistency, both the fixed and the random effects estimators require 
that Xitt and &i,t are uncorrelated at all leads and lags. This condition is 
not met  in the case  of  a model incorporating a lagged  dependent 
variable, as E[Yilt-l &ilt-l]#  0. 
In this case the fixed and random effects estimators described above will 
not give consistent results and an alternate transformation must be used. 
Several authors have noted that the equation can be first differenced to 
remove the individual effects10 
Consistent estimates of  the parameters in equation (4) can be obtained 
using instrumental variables. OLS cannot be used as (Yi,t-l - Yitt-2) is 
correlated  with  (&i,t  - &i,t-1).  Both  xt-2 and Yitt-2 - Yitt-3 are often 
suggested as appropriate instruments. 
-  - - -  --  - -  - 
lo See AreUano and Bover (1990), Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Keane 
and Runkle (1992). APPENDIX 2: DATA SOURCES 
Individual  company  data  are  taken  from  the  STATEX  database 
provided by the Australian Stock Exchange. Fifty-five companies were 
selected based on the following criteria: (i) the companies are in the top 
100 companies by market capitalisation, (ii) the companies are non- 
financial entities and (iii) data from 1980/81 to 1990/91 is available. The 
cash flow measure is real cash flow per share after  adjustment of 
revenue and cost items associated with options, partly paid shares and 
convertible securities and after adjustment  for intervening pro-rata 
issues to existing shareholders.  The dividend measure is real dividends 
per  share  adjusted  for  bonus  and  rights  issues.  The  private 
consumption deflator from the Australian National Accounts (Australian 
Bureau of  Statistics, Catalogue No. 5206.0, Table 11) is used as the price 
deflator. 
The tax discrimination variable is calculated using tax rate data from 
Australian  Economic  Statistics  (Occasional  Paper  No.  8,  Table  2.23) 
published by the Reserve Bank of  Australia, "Report of  the Commissioner 
of  Taxation",  Commissioner  of  Taxation  and  "Budget  Statements", 
Australian Government Publishing Service.  Weights are calculated 
from data supplied by the Australian Bureau of  Statistics. 
Long-run dividend payout ratios are calculated using data from the 
Australian National Accounts (Australian Bureau of  Statistics, Catalogue 
No. 5206.0, Tables 52 and 57).  Stock Exchange dividend payout ratios 
are calculated using earnings yield and dividend yield data from the 
Monthly Index Analysis published by the Australian Stock Exchange. REFERENCES 
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